Early mass communication

When Paul Brownstone wrote in 1970 regarding early efforts at using radio to educate and indoctrinate developing cultures, he promoted the idea of a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization University. He argued that:

The uses of the media of mass communication, cultural backgrounds and language vernaculars in the underdeveloped countries, specific education problems under different types of economies, and the politics, law and financing involved in successful international operation are topics which could be studied in a university preparing idealistic yet practical young people for the important job of the preservation and advancement of humanity. (p. 152)

While Brownstone's words described the use of radio and preceded the cultivation analysis work regarding television published by Gerbner and others, it set the stage for the international and intercultural cultivation analysis that forms the core topic of our discussion here.

The use of radio to build literacy discussed by Brownstone, and leading to his plea for a UNESCO university, was a unique method of mass communication used in Colombia to provide additional tools for the advancement of people and culture through education. Brownstone documents and discusses the important long distance radio education work of Jose Joaquin Salcedo. Salcedo embarked in 1947 on a plan to teach native Colombians to "read, write and cultivate their land and care for their stock using improved methods" (Brownstone, 1970, p. 145) using a radio system specially constructed for the purpose. This successful work lead to the documented literacy of 250,000 farm families; fathers, mothers, and children alike. This was a profound cultural change leading toward increased literacy in Colombia.

While the likelihood of radio use was small for farm families without access to these purpose built radio sets, the initial exposure of these native Colombians to mass communication was educational and cultural in nature. Their frequent exposure to educational radio broadcasts not only taught them to read and write, but also surely led to a more homogenous community of farmers. Formerly isolated, they now shared the experience of educational radio with their distant neighbors up to seven hundred miles away. Imagine the overnight improvement in communication technology taking place in that jungle. The incorporation of improved farming methods was bound to lead to a rudimentary form of mainstreaming as the newer methods became commonplace, supplanting the old methods or sporadic applications of newer ideas. While this sharing of community information was accomplished using radio, and not television, this very early example of mass communication in a developing country leading to commonly held methods and increased literacy tends to support Gerbner's later work without reference. These farmers were being pulled headlong into the mainstream of 20th century life by Fr. Salcedo's educational radio system.

The pristine nature of the Colombian culture in 1947 shows how mass communication can be introduced effectively into new and untouched cultures. This example also shows the profound effects of mass communication on a pristine society. Literacy was increased dramatically. Farming methods were certainly improved.

It cannot be shown that this modernization was all good for all people though. We are all aware of the growth of the illicit drug trade in Colombia in the 1950s and 1960s. Whether the literacy work of Fr. Salcedo accelerated this change cannot be decided in retrospect. It can be surely stated that without literacy and outside contact the drug trade would not have been possible. We can't blame Fr. Salcedo for the drug trade, but the backward culture that he helped to find a place in the 20th century eventually found a frightening 20th century niche to reside in. Changes have consequences. One of the consequences of literacy and contact with the broader world is contact with negative aspects of society. This is one argument used to avoid introducing new technologies into undeveloped cultures.

Some might argue that the pristine Colombian culture would have been better left alone, but this does not appear to be a practical argument. The cultural progress associated with written language has been so common in the world as to be viewed by most as unrelenting and inevitable. The recent development of a written language for the Hmong people, contemporaneous with their emigration to the United States and other foreign lands, is perhaps the latest example of the cultural progress associated with literacy. Mass communication certainly plays a part in these changes. Our challenge is not to resist the changes that time brings, but perhaps to study them for the knowledge that might lead to improvements in the use of mass communication in intercultural contexts, while striving to memorialize the cultures that existed beforehand.

If cultivation analysis can be used to improve mass communication in intercultural contexts, for the benefit of all cultures, the study of international and intercultural mass communication will be improved. This international and intercultural study must be built upon the foundation of cultivation analysis already in place. A review of the basics of cultivation analysis and theory reveals that intercultural contexts were initially not explored.

Cultivation Analysis; Questions for intercultural applications

Gerbner and Gross wrote in 1976 that their initial work in the late sixties and early seventies for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and under the sponsorship of the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior was aimed at documenting the causes of violence in the United States, with the hope that violence might be minimized (Gerbner and Gross, 1976). In 1976 they had studies in progress being funded by the National Institute of Mental Health. These studies had expanded beyond merely looking at violence to examine a broad range of cultural indicators. These studies included "a periodic study of television programming and of the conceptions of social reality that viewing cultivates in child and adult audiences" (Gerbner and Gross, 1976, p. 174). Broadening their work beyond violence, Gerbner and Gross wrote in 1976 that:

We begin with the assertion that television is the central cultural arm of American society. It is an agency of the established order and as such serves primarily to extend and maintain rather than to alter, threaten, or weaken conventional conceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. Its chief cultural function is to spread and stabilize social patterns, to cultivate not change but resistance to change. Television is a medium of the socialization of most people into standardized roles and behaviors. Its function is, in a word, enculturation. (p. 175)

Additionally Gerbner and Gross argue that this enculturation is facilitated by the establishment of reality by fictional representations. This argument has anecdotal and scientific bases. Gerbner proposes that "even the most sophisticated can find many important components of their knowledge of the real world derived wholly or in part from fictional representation" (Gerbner and Gross, 1976, p. 179). If such is the case, it could occur in intercultural contexts also, but the possibility for mixed signals is much greater. The viewer might mistake the local world as being identical with that shown by foreign programs. The foreign viewer might also mistake the narrow depiction of a few television programs for the totality of the American or other exporting culture's experience. The possibility for drawing incorrect conclusions about either the host culture or the exporting culture must not be overlooked.

The possibility of cultural imperialism must also be addressed. Cultural imperialism is broadly defined as "'a verifiable process of social influence by which a nation imposes on other countries its set of beliefs, values, knowledge and behavioral norms as well as its overall style of life' (Beltran, 1078b, p. 184). Media effects researchers working in the behavioral or social scientific tradition frequently view cultural imperialism as a subject for ideological debate rather than scientific inquiry" (Salwen, 1991, p. 29). This lack of scientific inquiry could be remedied through cultivation analysis research. While the rhetoric regarding cultural imperialism rages, cultivation analysis could help to provide data indicating where the situation actually occurs and to what extent it affects the culture of the lesser nation. "In this regard, Gerbner and Gross's (1976) cultivation hypothesis offers a valuable framework for studying cultural effects" (p. 34).

Careful analysis will be necessary for intercultural investigations since the central theme of cultivation analysis; that the society as a whole is revealed by and solidified from television programming, comes apart at the seams if the context of the program is clearly outside the context of the viewer. Are viewers in danger of losing their culture to the outside programming influence, or is the source of the outside programming in danger of being stereotyped by the viewing audience? Is the viewing audience likely to become mainstreamed into the world view of the foreign source or on the contrary perhaps draw only limited conclusions about the foreign source instead? The viewers might form a limited picture of the foreign source since they are unable to form a truly broad picture of the foreign culture without the full spectrum of programming the foreign country might not produce but not export. "The application of cultivation analysis to cultural effects studies provides an opportunity to examine whether repeated exposure to television images from core nations cultivates views of one's own society, another society, or both" (Salwen, 1991, p. 34).

Elihu Katz grapples with the important question of indigenous versus imported programming in African, South American, European, Middle Eastern, Mexican, and Far Eastern countries. Indigenous programming alleviates the concern over acceptance of the imported production as truth, since the audience easily recognizes the production as locally significant and having the proper classification as drama or documentary, but indigenous programming does not remove the question of whether or not the cultivation effect will take place in foreign cultures. The important concern of preservation of authentic cultures in the face of modernization is addressed by Katz asking: "Cannot broadcasting give voice to culturally authentic forms of expression? Looking at the screen or listening to the radio, it certainly seems as if they cannot. But let us permit ourselves, at least, to ask the question" (Katz, 1977, p. 114). Surely indigenous programming would have the opportunity to result in mainstreaming of the audience in concert with the traditional aspects of the culture, but whether this cultivation phenomenon is applicable or even occurs in all cultures is still in question. Katz suggests that traditional content could have a place in mass media. The extension that cultivation of the historical culture would occur has not been proven or even tried, but seems to be one hope of preserving authentic cultures through modern means. Shija's recommended use of modern methods provides one possible path.

Shija advocates the use of video tape and video dissemination to document authentic cultures in Africa and elsewhere. "The more a culture strives to adopt new ways of maintaining itself, the more the members are likely to understand others while maintaining their culture (Samovar and Porter, 1985)" (Shija, 1988, p. 24). This argument for authentic programming using inexpensive techniques is expected to provide resources that a less wealthy nation could use on a fairly large scale to promote their traditional culture. "Modern but moderate communication technologies such as the video system may be used to counter foreign, negative media messages by promoting the indigenous but positive cultural images such as those in Africa" (Shija, 1988, p. 24). This would provide historical and traditional themes for the use of the indigenous people and foreign markets alike. Without authentic historical and traditional themes, some audiences will just avoid mass media altogether, as the Treaty Indians of Saskatchewan have done to a limited extent (Demay, 1991). By including authentic traditional themes these otherwise marginalized viewers could share their culture with others while participating more fully in their heritage through modern technology.

The opportunity to resonate with historical themes does not guarantee enculturation of traditional values, but the lack of documented evidence that traditional programming could result in preservation of traditional culture has not prevented the widespread adoption of the basic tenets of cultivation analysis theory by many countries. Developing country governments seem to instinctively understand that foreign programming could enculturate the viewer with a foreign culture. Almost every country with a developing television industry regulates, either implicitly or explicitly, the amount of foreign programming permitted. For instance, "in 1972 the Iranian Council of Ministers gave as the first aim of Iranian broadcasting 'to assist in safeguarding, developing and propagating Iranian Culture'" (Katz, 1977, p. 114). This solid affirmation by the Iranians that their television programming would contribute to their indigenous culture is echoed by Canadian, British, Greek, Thai, and many other governments. This instinctive acceptance of the basic tenets of cultivation theory; that television can influence the world view of the audience; has resulted in concern by many governments that a less developed culture might lose their history and their identity to the imperialist airwaves of foreign productions. As Katz points out:

The implication of all this -- for planners, for broadcasters, for academics -- is to take entertainment seriously, If broadcasting is to be harnessed to the goal of promoting indigenous values, it is important to understand how entertainment works. That means understanding what message is implicit in 'Hawaii 5-0,' what people perceive in it, what they enjoy, what it 'gives' them, and then, by contrast, analyzing the experience with home-made broadcast entertainment and with entertainment in traditional culture. The Peruvian revolutionaries who want to harness the media to their ideas for creating a society based on the rehabilitation of traditional Inca values insist that it is 'alienating' to make the conventional Western distinction among information, education, and entertainment. (Katz, 1977, p. 117)

This parallels and resonates with Gerbner's assertion that television is far more than just entertainment. The Western distinctions between information, education and entertainment discussed by Katz do not occur to Gerbner. Cultivation analysis theory according to Gerbner argues that there is truly no distinction at all. All programming is enculturating. Katz makes a strong argument based on the instinctive responses of many governments to television that intercultural cultivation is a fact and a factor in the post-modern world.

Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, et al. support the lack of distinction between programming types when they decide to look at all programming, not just dramatic or educational programming, to understand the cultivation effect. Their arguments in 1977 made it clear that they felt CBS was wrong in trying to eliminate comic, natural, or accidental violence from the violence profile accounting. Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, et al. argue rightly and in synchronization with Katz that regardless of venue, the content of television has enculturating effects. This key point seems to cross cultures instinctively. Decision makers in many countries have taken it as intuitively obvious that the type of programming is not the issue. The issue is cultural content. The nature of the programming is not germane to whether or not the cultivation effect occurs. The cultivation effect is accomplished by the total programming palette, not a specific set of programs. This instinctive understanding of the unique nature of television accounts, at least in part, for the implicit and explicit regulation of foreign programming by many countries today.

In studying the Cree culture, Granzberg, Steinbring, and Hamer found that the Cree accepted television as a natural extension of one of their old traditions. The Cree culture had an ancient conjuring ceremony called the shaking tent. In the shaking tent ceremony a shaman would conjure spirits that could tell the shaman what was happening far away. The television was sufficiently reminiscent of the shaking tent ceremony that the Cree people took it to be similar if not identical. The shaking tent ceremony assumed that what the spirits imparted to the shaman was true. This was also assumed by the Cree to apply to television. In this way the Cree believed that what was portrayed on television was in fact a truthful and exact representation of events far away. This led to some interesting reactions on the part of the Cree people.

Granzberg et al. found that "For the Saulteaux and Cree, the failure to distinguish between real events and fictional ones on television is a pervasive phenomenon" (1977, p. 155). For this reason the Cree would imbue the programming with importance that went beyond the dramatic nature intended by the producers. This led to many elders speaking out against television for children. It seemed that the elders felt that the shaman in the shaking tent ceremony could deal with the spirits in the tent from a position of strength and experience, but children could not deal with the spirits in the television in the same strong way. For this reason many elders felt that children should be shielded from the spirits portrayed on television. This was exacerbated by the very nature of television since:

It seems that today many Cree feel that TV, with its sex and violence (two things abhorred if observed in public), is like an evil spirit that is capable of producing nightmares and possessing the bodies of children to make them act badly. This would explain why some Cree refuse to have TV in their homes or feel it necessary to destroy a newly bought TV, and why others refuse to allow their children to watch scary programs. Significantly, as we have noted earlier, these are usually the people who are the most traditional in Cree society. (Granzberg et al., 1977, p. 157)

This response of the Cree seems to be avoidance based upon reluctance to turn their children over to spirit influences. This is certainly far different from the entertainment function usually given to television. This does seem consistent with Gerbner's view of television as being able to enculturate the viewer. Gerbner's view is not too far removed from the Cree expectation that television could change the behavior of children through its influence.

In addition to avoidance, the Cree seem to be "very susceptible to TV, to take it literally and seriously, to idolize the superhero characters, to read special messages into it concerning behavior requirements, and to be especially concerned about its potential harm to children" (Granzberg et al., 1977, p. 157). This would argue for a culture specific approach to cultivation analysis studying the effects of television on intercultural audiences.

Granzberg, et al. conclude by observing:

This has broad implications for communication research, especially with respect to the now rapid diffusion of TV into traditional non-Western societies. It suggests that we cannot consider TV to be a uniform phenomenon cross-culturally: TV is a different thing to different people and its impact varies according to the cultural traditions that surround it. (Granzberg et al., 1977, p. 157)

This viewpoint must be taken into account when performing studies in intercultural contexts. The use of cultivation analysis on intercultural audiences could assume an understanding of the programming material that does not exist. Careful investigation will reveal the way television is used by the foreign audience, but only through investigation of not only the effects but also the cultural biases and history of the culture can the researcher hope to discern the way television impacts the intercultural audience.

Perhaps authentic Cree programming could have alleviated some of the concerns over television's negative effects. Perhaps authentic Cree stories could have been used to better enculturate the Cree with their historical values and beliefs. While the Cree did not have the technical competence to accomplish this programming, the issue of authentic programming has been discussed as a possible benefit for aboriginal cultures (Shija, 1988) helping to smooth the transition from their less technological past to the television age and beyond.

The questions for intercultural examination of cultivation effects, mainstreaming, and resonance include the following:

(1) Will mass communication in intercultural contexts show evidence of cultivation of the foreign culture in the host community?

(2) Will mass communication in intercultural contexts result in stereotyped images of the foreign source of programming?

(3) Can authentic cultures survive the importation of foreign mass media? Can cultivation analysis help them to survive?

(4) What factors influence the occurrence or absence of cultivation effects in intercultural contexts?

These questions will be investigated as we explore intercultural mass media research and cultivation analysis theory.

Cultivation Analysis; Background and criticism

Gerbner had critics during his investigations. Along with CBS, Paul M. Hirsch took issue with Gerbner's work. Hirsch refers to work by Wober in 1978 that showed "no evidence of a paranoic (sic) effect of television viewing on British audiences" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 406). This evidence was cited to support Hirsch's contention that cultivation was not a universal effect, but merely a construct of the Annenberg School that Gerbner led. Another of Hirsch's arguments against Gerbner's work is embodied in Hirsch's statement that according to the data used by Gerbner and the others, "Extreme viewers are less perturbed than heavy viewers" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 408). Hirsch performed extensive statistical analysis on Gerbner's data, finding no support for Gerbner's cultivation analysis theory. In particular Hirsch statistically separated the "extreme" viewers with eight or more hours of viewing per day from Gerbner's heavy viewers with only four to seven hours daily viewing. Hirsch also statistically separated the non-viewers from Gerbner's light viewers and performed statistical analyses on the now four sets of viewers. He found that "non-viewers gave the television answer more often than those viewing one to two hours daily, and the extreme viewers gave the television answer less often than those viewing four to seven hours per day" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 431). These findings cast serious doubt on Gerbner's work since it would be expected that non-viewers would show less cultivation effect than light viewers and that extreme viewers, almost glued to their television sets, would show more cultivation than the heavy viewers with more moderate habits. Hirsch's analysis did not support this expected result.

Hirsch explains the evidence regarding non viewers by noting that:

In other words, what small relationships there are between viewing and other variables are nonlinear wherever people who watch no television turn out to be more fearful, alienated, or anomic than those classified as light, medium or heavy viewers. This finding is clearly counter to the cultivation hypothesis, in which it is the responses of those least exposed to the "messages" about life transmitted by "television reality" which should be closest to the "real world" in terms of a more positive view of their personal affairs, life chances, and fellow man. (Hirsch, 1980, p. 419)

These findings were unequivocal in their denial of the cultivation effect.

Hirsch finds support in Gerbner's writing for treating non-viewers as a control group, and points out that Gerbner fails to accomplish this control analysis. Hirsch then separates the non-viewers from the light viewers and finds evidence that the expected result is reversed when the new data is analyzed. Hirsch's finding that "nonviewers consistently provide the 'TV answer' more frequently than do viewers of one or two hours daily" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 422) would tend to show that a control group analysis could not support the contention that television shapes the viewer's world view in a consistent and linear manner.

Hirsch continues his criticisms by separating the heavy viewers from the extreme viewers. He finds that "extreme viewers provide the television answer less often than heavy viewers for a majority of the rows in 11 (61%) of the tables" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 431). Hirsch again finds the cultivation analysis theory lacking support at the ends of the spectrum of viewing hours. His analysis indicates that in the case of physical violence, the non-viewer was actually more likely to support the use of violence than the extreme viewer. He found in the case of endorsing the use of physical violence:

Here we see not only that the percentage of respondents endorsing the use of physical violence generally decreases as we move from the light to heavy viewing categories; but also that it is the extreme viewers who disapprove most of the idea, and the nonviewers who are most likely to embrace such 'aggression.'" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 433)

Hirsch also criticizes the analysis technique of using single control variables for age, sex, and education. Hirsch argues that multivariate analysis is more rigorous and more appropriate. Application of multivariate analysis techniques on Gerbner's own data leads Hirsch to the conclusion that it is not television viewing hours that gives a person a perception of the world as a mean and scary place, but instead that education, race and age have more to do with it.

Hirsch finds evidence that "the apparent effect of television-viewing (sic) disappears after controlling for age, sex, education, and race simultaneously" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 436). In particular Hirsch finds that "the negative sign in five of the six cases means that television's heaviest viewers provide the 'television answer' in smaller percentages than nonviewers" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 439). Hirsch's conclusions that Gerbner's "assertion is found severely wanting when standard statistical techniques employed in social science research are applied to these data....the effect of television-viewing (sic) is clearly minimal when the responses of nonviewers and extreme viewers are analyzed separately" (Hirsch, 1980, p.449). Hirsch also questioned the methods and the competence of Gerbner's work by stating not only that "we found the 'separate and independent' effect of television viewing to be non-existent" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 439) but that the "cultivation hypothesis is itself an ironic distortion of the 'real world' of data analysis" (Hirsch, 1980, p. 439). These strong words were obviously intended to cast doubt on Gerbner's work in the strongest academic terms.

Hirsch presents considerable evidence that Gerbner's cultivation analysis theory is flawed. Taken as a whole, Hirsch's arguments would indicate that Gerbner's findings were a sort of self fulfilling prophecy, by showing that the direction of variation in beliefs was unimportant in the mainstreaming examples. Hirsch criticizes this sort of post hoc analysis as unscientific. Hirsch characterizes it as reminiscent of analysis done to confirm a commonly held belief or superstition. This could be consistent with the intuitive acceptance of the cultivation effect by world leaders and commoners alike. The instinctive reaction to television by many new users and policy makers in developed and undeveloped areas has been suspicion and mistrust. The idea that television can cultivate beliefs in line with the content of programs is tempting to say the least, and commonly held also. Hirsch argues, without explicitly stating the argument, that the cultivation effect might better go the way of the "hypodermic needle" or "magic bullet theory" that was effectively dispelled by the work of Lazarsfeld and others.

Part II of Hirsch's critical assessment of The Annenberg School efforts focused on refinements of the cultivation analysis theory. Mainstreaming was investigated, with the comment that the application of mainstreaming removed rigor from the original theory and allowed for varying outcomes regardless of the amount of television viewed. Hirsch was critical of the Annenberg approach of finding evidence for mainstreaming. He took issue with the way Gerbner and the others at Annenberg reviewed data to find evidence of coherence as a pre-test for analysis. This could have tended to investigate only instances where there was, in fact, mainstreaming, and eliminate instances where mainstreaming might have not been evident.

Hirsch summarizes the two central themes of his critical attack as:

(1) The Annenberg group's formulation(s) is (are) so inclusive that no matter what respondents answer on survey items, it can be argued to support one or another variant of the cultivation hypothesis. This treatment makes the assertion both irrefutable and untestable, almost by definition.

(2) The detailed reanalyzes presented here shows that, notwithstanding their reformulated theory's growing ambiguity and lack of precision, the data analysis reported by the Annenberg team frequently overlooks standard statistical procedures. This makes it difficult for readers to infer which version(s) of their theory (if any) is (are) supported empirically. (Hirsch, 1981, p. 5)

Hirsch's disagreements with the Annenberg School are deeply rooted. His analysis relies upon standard statistical methods and does not support their conclusions.

Hirsch points out that expected resonance with at risk groups does not occur. In black women the most fearful are the light viewers, not the heavy viewers (Hirsch, 1981, p. 12). Hirsch argues and provides statistical evidence that education and work status are better correlated with the answers to the questions intended to illustrate and support the theory that television viewers see the world as a mean and scary place, in line with the content of television programming. "Heavy viewers in such victimized sub-groups are no more likely than their counterparts in other groups to interpret television content in a manner consistent with the categories in the Violence Profiles. In sum, the general finding of no relationship is reaffirmed" (Hirsch, 1981, p. 18). Hirsch also claims that fallacies associated with statistical analysis can account for the evidence that heavy viewers hold more similar views than light viewers. Hirsch continues in Part II of his analysis to disparage and ridicule the Annenberg efforts. Hirsch even goes so far as to present statistical evidence that astrological signs are more closely tied to resonance and mainstreaming than television viewing hours. This sort of sarcastic ploy reveals the depth and breadth of the rift between these research teams.

Hirsch provides several explanations for the absence of cultivation effects. (Remember now that Hirsch believes he has effectively refuted all of the arguments associated with cultivation analysis theory and shown it to be a sham.) He has three proposed reasons for a lack of cultivation in heavy viewers: (1) randomness; (2) differential availability; and (3) status inconsistency. The argument that effects are random has no heuristic value, except to discount the work of the Annenberg School. The discussion of differential availability merits serious consideration.

Hirsch's theory of differential availability relies on a sort of self-selection bias. Hirsch believes that the heaviest viewers are "disproportionately housewives, sick people, unemployed, and with low income. They are among the most alienated members of our society to begin with and are available to watch large amounts of television because they are confined to the home much of the time" (Hirsch, 1981, p. 32). This could account for the increased incidence of frightened individuals in heavy viewing groups. This could also account for the perception by these individuals that strangers are not friendly. This bias toward alienated individuals in heavy viewing groups must be considered in the intercultural contexts as well. Emigrants or sojourners are apt to be alienated from the host culture. Any intercultural studies that investigate emigrants or sojourners must take this possibility into account. Even in native viewers watching imported programming, the possibility of illness, unemployment, alienation, anomie, and even depression must be considered. The aspect of age also merits examination. In America a large proportion of heavy viewers are older residents. In intercultural contexts this might result in older viewers being less likely to use or trust television since it could have been introduced late in their lives. These more traditional older people might be the most likely to criticize the foreign influence of television on the native culture. This sort of bias could result in a heavy viewer with a very critical attitude toward television programming. Hirsch states that "Research indicates that alienation and isolation tend to stimulate heavy media consumption rather than vice versa" (Hirsch, 1981, p. 33). We must be careful to consider this possibility in intercultural studies too.

Hirsch's discussion of status inconsistency "suggests that individuals who occupy different social statuses considered mutually incongruous by others experience role strain, status ambivalence, and high anxiety (see Jackson, 1962)" (Hirsch, 1981, p. 33). Hirsch believes that low-status and low-income and low-education people are more likely to be heavy viewers. High-status and high-income and highly-educated people are more likely to be light viewers. He cites evidence that the viewers acting out of synchronization with these stereotypes are more likely to evidence the world view consistent with fear and mistrust that Gerbner associates with the heavy viewer. This status inconsistency could have implications for intercultural contexts also. It is certainly possible that emigrants might be functioning out of class, probably on a lower scale than they were accustomed to in their native land. It is also possible that this status inconsistency is the result of some near term upset in the person's life. Perhaps the person has changed lifestyle or become ill or married into a different status. These sorts of changes can also produce alienation and anomie, and might happen in intercultural contexts quite often.

Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorelli replied to Hirsch's criticisms with arguments from their large body of supporting evidence. The data used by Hirsch was almost entirely from one data set, and could have been anomalous. Their remark that:

Hirsch has come to his conclusions based upon analysis of one data set, the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (GSS/NORC), incorporating some questions (e.g. the series on suicide) which have no connection with known data about the television world, and others which exhibit some of the weakest association we have ever found. (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorelli, 1981, p. 40)

This indicates that Gerbner et al. do not consider Hirsch's statistical analysis of this suspect data set to be meaningful. They cite four other data sets that they have used, indicating that it is the overall weight of the evidence that leads them to believe that cultivation analysis theory, mainstreaming, and resonance are real phenomena associated with heavy television viewing. Gerbner, et al. indicate that their classification of light medium and heavy viewers was intended to split the viewer group into three segments, not document the most extreme cases. In addition they characterize the non-viewers as a "bizarre and inconsistent segment" (Gerbner, et al. 1981, p. 47).

The non-viewers are better educated than viewers and tend to work in higher-level careers; and yet they have significantly lower incomes (Jackson-Beeck, 1977); and had higher family incomes when they were 16 (Tankard and Harris, 1980). While they are more likely to have been raised in a "traditional," nuclear family, they tend to be unmarried and childless. They are more likely than are viewers to claim no religious preference (Jackson-Beeck, 1977); they also have a stronger view of themselves as religious but attend religious services less often (Tankard and Harris, 1980). (Gerbner, et al. 1981, p. 47)

This description of the non-viewer certainly casts doubt upon any conclusions drawn from their input alone. It seems that the Annenberg School approach of low, medium, and high television use might be preferable to using non-viewers as a control group at all.

Gerbner, et al. also point out that Hirsch makes claims using "the television answer" that have no bearing on the content analysis done by the Annenberg school. This nullifies many of Hirsch's refutations as spurious, since the original arguments were not advocated by Gerbner, et al. Hirsch has the luxury of inappropriate attribution to thank for his ability to disprove conclusions that were never part of the cultivation analysis done by the Annenberg group. Gerbner summarizes a main complaint about Hirsch's work in the statement: "As in part I, his reliance on one sample, further contaminated by questionable items, provides no basis whatsoever for his dismissal of our accumulated findings" (Gerbner, et al. 1981, p. 55). The statistical evidence cited by the Annenberg School indicate that "483 out of 580 'double controlled' correlations (83.3%) remain positive and significant. In this light, our contention that 'most groups' show evidence of cultivation hardly deserves Hirsch's sarcasm" (Gerbner, et al. 1981, p. 64).

Hirsch continued his critical assessment of the Annenberg School efforts in 1981. He restated his belief in the validity of the GSS/NORC since "NORC's GSS is probably the most widely used and widely trusted data base employed by social scientists interested in secondary analysis" (Hirsch, 1981, p. 77-78). He challenges the Annenberg School to make their proprietary data bases available for public analysis. He again ridicules the work of Gerbner, et al. as "speculative, nonpredictive, unspecified, post hoc, and irrefutable" (Hirsch, 1981, p. 79). Hirsch seems to find continuous fault with any approach of the Annenberg School that does not predetermine the nature of the expected effects. The Annenberg approach is more apt to notice effects than to predict them. Hirsch appears troubled by this investigative style. The Annenberg School seems comfortable with documenting the findings of their studies without being required to predict exactly the nature of the responses in advance. This approach is consistent with the ever changing nature of the television landscape. Rather than take a rigid approach, the Annenberg School documents their findings carefully with the overlay of cultivation and resonance and mainstreaming that they have seen previously. Hirsch does not accept this investigative approach, appearing to prefer a more rigorous theory with little room for the study of mass communication in progress.

The response of the Annenberg School indicates comfort with the continuous nature of their investigations and an inquisitive and questioning nature. Their work was shown to be validated by others and has been used extensively before and after Hirsch's critical attacks. The concepts of mainstreaming, resonance, and cultivation have been accepted by scholars as valid constructions (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorelli, 1981). Rigorous static theoretical testing may not be appropriate since the very foundation of mass communication in general and television in particular is far from static. The extent to which other scholars have accepted and used Gerbner's work also argues for the use of the cultivation analysis model, at least in the American case. As we embark upon the investigation of intercultural contexts, we must be careful to preserve that inquisitive and questioning nature, along with the flexibility to appreciate findings as they occur.

International mass communication research

K. Kyoon Hur reports in 1982 on international mass communication research in an effort to highlight areas of strength and weakness in theory and research, discus common agreements, and suggest further efforts. The effort is hindered by a lack of coordinated effort and a lack of a solidifying theme. The overall situation gives the impression that three or four major areas of research are being pursued, some on several fronts, without any interaction or global vision. "Despite the plethora of research in international communication, however, there have been few systematic attempts to reflect accurately the state of the art in research and theory in pertinent areas of the field" (Hur, 1982, p. 531-532). Even though an overall vision is lacking, there are some interesting points made regarding international mass communication.

Two "well-founded trends emerged in the international flow of television programs: a one-way traffic from the big exporting countries to the rest of the world and the domination of entertainment materials in the flow of television programs" (Hur, 1982, p. 543). Hur documents studies by Nordenstreng and Varis, done in 1974, that "proposed a number of hypotheses indicating that the flow of television programs across nations is influenced by the wealth and power of the nation, economic and demographic characteristics of the television audience of the nation, and tariffs imposed on programming importation by the nation" (Hur, 1982, p. 544). This has ramifications for our study of cultivation since the flow of television programs is necessary for intercultural cultivation to become a possibility. All of our examples follow the model discussed by Hur, and illustrate the flow of television from large exporting countries to smaller importing countries. Our examples of interest typically show television programming flowing from America to less prosperous nations even though Australia, Canada, and Japan are certainly prosperous in their own right.

This flow from prosperous America to less prosperous countries is consistent with the "free flow paradigm" discussed by Schement, Gonzalez, Lum, and Valencia (1984). They explain the free flow paradigm as being "the result of market forces" (p. 165). They believe that the free flow paradigm has gained some favor "because it demonstrates a freedom of exchange of ideas (which is thought to be necessary to guarantee the continued functioning of democratic institutions)" (p. 165). This free flow of information has been supported by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) that "stresses the 'free flow of information within countries and across frontiers'; such flow across borders is considered to be of greater importance than the right of nations to bar this movement of media products across their borders" (p. 165). The major problem with the free flow paradigm revolved around the dominance of American television in the world market. "The superabundance of United States television programs in most Third World television systems seemed to argue against a simple marketplace interpretation" (p. 168).

This dominance of American programming led to the American hegemony paradigm as an explanation of why the American television programs were widely exported. "A central element in the American hegemony paradigm is the role played by transnational corporations in determining the flow of television programs. The transnational corporations act as independently minded extensions of American policy" (Schement, Gonzalez, Lum, and Valencia, 1984, p. 168). Third world countries, perhaps becoming more sensitive to the cultivation effects of television in the 1970s, began to become interested in preserving their native culture, and holding onto market share as well. This led to "sentiment supporting the American hegemony paradigm [that] grew from the efforts of Third World countries to assert self-determination in a world they perceived as being carved up between two opposing camps. Existing flows of television programs were criticized as constituting cultural domination, and therefore a threat to national sovereignty" (p. 169).

Schement, Gonzalez, Lum, and Valencia propose an alternative model of international flow. Their work proposes a middle ground model, building upon the two dominant models in existence. The two competing models most discussed tend to be incompatible and arguments regarding their explanations would lead the researcher to side with one or the other. "The 'free flow of information' paradigm versus the 'American hegemony' paradigm" (Schement, Gonzalez, Lum, and Valencia, 1984, p. 163) both compete for prominence in mass communication research. The alternative model explained by Schement, Gonzalez, Lum, and Valencia takes a process approach. They identify "(1) structural conditions that form the potential for the media flows, and (2) catalytic actions that operationalize the flows" (Schement, Gonzalez, Lum, and Valencia, 1984, p. 164).

The structural conditions proposed by Schement, Gonzalez, Lum, and Valencia include an audience, available technology, financial and political support for the flow of television programs, and nonobstructive legal climates in both nations. The catalytic conditions are expected to occur at two stages, the awareness and decision stage where television flows originate and the organizing stage where the flow logistics are allocated resources to physically accomplish the transfer. The resources include capital, infrastructure, technology, and of course, an inventory of television programs. The advantage of this "middle-range" paradigm model is clear from the application to flows in any direction where the structural and catalytic conditions occur. Schement, Gonzalez, Lum, and Valencia document the successful implementation of the Spanish International Network in America as one example that would not fit either the free flow paradigm or the American hegemony paradigm. The Spanish International Network (SIN) does fit the middle ground model quite well for once the structural and catalytic conditions were in place, the SIN flow from Mexican stations to America happened successfully.

A continuing area of interest highlighted by Hur involves the notion of cultural imperialism. If cultivation analysis holds in intercultural contexts, cultural imperialism as a result of international television flows is almost a certainty. Whether the cultivation results in stereotypes of the foreign source or mainstreaming of the host culture toward the world view of the program exporter, the changes in world view are quite real. Hur recommends work by Nordenstreng and Schiller (1979) and work by Katz and Wedell (1979) as illustrative of the argument over whether global television flow is the product of audience demands or due "to the international television marketing structure dominated by developed nations" (Hur, 1982, p. 544). In addition to the work cited above, work by Schnitman in 1981 deals with the notion of cultural imperialism or media imperialism. This must remain on our list of important international and intercultural policy issues since we have seen more than one example of "policy solutions calling for the 'the new world information order,' for actual introduction of protective measures against economic domination and cultural homogenization (Katz and Wedell, 1979; Schnitman, 1981), and for research direction linking communication aspects to economic aspects (Jussawalla, 1979)" (Hur, 1982 p. 545).

Hur provides a series of studies that show limited effects on Canadians, Icelandic children, Romanian children, and Formosan children. Hur does acknowledge the powerful mass media notion of Noelle-Neumann (1973), Robinson (1974), and Deutsch and Merritt (1965). Hur references the cultivation work of Pingree and Hawkins as a major departure from the other studies discussed, possibly indicative of the pervasive impact of cultivation effects. These are the cultivation effects that interest us most today.

Hur provides a conservative view of international mass media communication themes, acknowledging late in the work that cultivation analysis theory can have wide ranging ramifications where it occurs. It is the purpose of this paper to build upon Hur's indication of the path of future research in intercultural mass media contexts and explore cultivation, mainstreaming, and resonance in intercultural applications.

Intercultural examples

Hawkins and Pingree studied school children in Australia and found replication of cultivation effects to be easily documented in this intercultural context. The intercultural nature of the study is exemplified by the observation that :

The Australian setting of this research may allow another insight into the processes involved in cultivation effects because of the dominance of American programs on Australian television. Commercial television in Perth is largely American reruns (100% during 4-6 pm, 50-70% during primetime), and schoolchildren in our sample watch over 90% American programs in the categories of situation comedy, crime-adventure, and drama. This content is clearly American -- American accents, American cities, American cars (driving on the wrong side of the road!) --and is obviously applicable to constructions of what life is like in America, but not necessarily to life in Australia. (Hawkins and Pingree, 1980, p. 200)

It is instructional that the cultivation effect was replicated in Australia, with predominantly American programming. These cultures are similar, of course, but the results discussed previously by Hirsch; the failure of Wober to replicate the cultivation effect in Britain in 1978; would not lead the researcher to expect to replicate the American phenomenon of cultivation effects seen by Gerbner, et al. in every intercultural case. Perhaps the colony of Australia is more like the previously colonized America than the English homeland studied by Wober. It is important enough to note the ability of the cultivation effect to cross cultural barriers at all that we must mark this as a strong data point that, at least in western cultures, cultivation of a particular world view by American programming in non-American (in this case Australian) contexts is possible.

Four questions were given to Australian school children in the Hawkins and Pingree study. In "each case those giving the TV-biased answer watched more television" (Hawkins and Pingree, 1980, p. 203). They conclude that "Gerbner's basic cultivation results were replicated in this Australian sample (Hawkins and Pingree, 1980, p. 207). Some differences between the Australian and American results were noted:

The one individual partial worth noting is the decrease in the cultivation relationship for Mean World when controlled by social class, from .17 to .11. Taking social class as a relatively fixed prior characteristic and taking television viewing as preceding beliefs about the world (Gerbner's assumption, justified by the peculiar biases found through message systems analysis), the most plausible interpretation is that the relationship between television viewing and seeing Australia as a Mean World is partly spurious: Students from the lower-SES area both watch more television and perceive more meanness. This relationship to social class is much stronger than those reported in American samples, and may represent a stronger class system in Australia..." (Hawkins and Pingree, 1980, p. 208-209)

In addition to class differences, Hawkins and Pingree reported that younger children did not seem to be open to cultivation effects due to their inability to process the information completely. Younger children may not even pick up the symbolic messages sufficiently to manifest the cultivation effect. This may be important evidence to consider in future studies. Children under the age of eight or nine might not provide meaningful data on cultivation effects. "Second- and fifth-grade children, although viewers of the sorts of television programs in which symbolic messages about Mean World and Violence seem most clear, apparently do not abstract from these programs the patterns of action and characterization that would allow a cultivation effect to occur" (Hawkins and Pingree, 1980, p. 220).

The studies in Perth done by Pingree and Hawkins found that the perception of the world as a mean and scary place were more related to watching American television than to watching Australian television, and those perceptions were applied, not to the U.S., but to their homeland in Australia. Pingree and Hawkins state that "for these Australian children, it is watching U.S. television shows that relates to television-biased conceptions of reality about Australia" (Pingree and Hawkins, 1981, p. 102). They attribute this to "the fact that much of the imported U.S. programming and very little of the non-U.S. programming is crime-adventure" (Pingree and Hawkins, 1981, p.103). While this may be the cause, the facts indicate that the U.S. programming tends to affect the viewer's understanding of Australian life much more than the viewer's perception of American life.

...viewing U.S. television did not appear to relate to a television bias in beliefs about the U.S....The correlations for viewing U.S. television and the Mean World and Violence in Society responses about the U.S. are almost nonexistent. Surprisingly, Australian children do not seem to base their conceptions of what life is like in the U.S. on their viewing of U.S. program content. However, when U.S. programs are separated by content types..., a slightly different picture emerges. Viewing U.S. programs correlates more strongly with beliefs about Australia than with beliefs about the U.S., particularly for crime-adventure programs and situation comedies. But viewing crime-adventure programs does correlate with the television-biased response that the U.S. is a "mean world (r=.09). Apparently, Australian children are influenced by U.S. crime-adventure programs in their concepts of social reality for their own country, and to a lesser extent for the U.S. (Pingree and Hawkins, 1981, p. 103)

This is a profound finding. It indicates that the Australian viewer forms a biased view of their own country as the result of viewing foreign television. While this dramatic finding has some ironic appeal, it cannot be classed as intuitive or self evident. This particular intercultural context was in Australia, with American television being the programming of interest. It may be more difficult to observe similar results in other contexts with more disparate cultures involved.

Pingree and Hawkins acknowledge the difficulty of transferring this result to more disparate cultures when they remark that "it appears that Australian children take little notice of such things as U.S. accents and locations, accepting them as television conventions. Whether this would extend to cultures that differ from the U.S. more than does Australia is another question" (Pingree and Hawkins, 1981, p. 104).

Pingree and Hawkins conclude that the cultivation effect is not culture bound and does not require that the programming be in the culture of the viewer. Additionally they find that the perceptions of the world are applied to the home of the viewer, not as stereotypes of the foreign programming source. This contrasts with the work of Wober in Great Britain, but as Pingree and Hawkins point out: "Wober (8) did not find Violence in Society or Mean World cultivation relationships in Great Britain, where U.S. programs make up only 15 percent of television programming" (1981, p. 104) and violence is not as evident on British television. This lower American programming density would certainly result in less cultivation of the American world view since for a relatively similar amount of viewing, the heavy viewer might have to watch six times the American heavy viewer's six or seven hours per day, more than the hours available, in order to be exposed to the same amount of American programming as the heavy American viewer.

Studies in the Philippines found that American television could also influence the values of Philippine high school students. Work by Tan, Tan, and Tan showed that heavy viewers of American television evidenced non-traditional values, more like those shown by the television programs than the traditional values of their Philippine homeland. Frequent viewers of American television were more likely to rate pleasure to be an important value than infrequent viewers. Salvation, wisdom, and forgiveness were seen as less important by frequent viewers than by infrequent viewers. The traditional values of salvation, wisdom and forgiveness were relegated to a lesser position by watching American television, if the cultivation effect is the reason for the difference. Pleasure, a frequent ingredient of American television, was ranked as more important by frequent viewers of American television, but pleasure "was not considered an important value by our average Filipino respondent" (Tan, Tan, and Tan, 1987, p. 72).

The experience in the Philippines parallels that in Australia. In the Philippines traditional values may have been supplanted by a non-traditional emphasis on pleasure as the result of cultivation effects. The data show positive correlation between heavy viewing of American television and these differing values in high school students. This should be marked as another instance of the cultivation effect in an intercultural context. Philippine high school students adopted foreign values more often when they viewed more American television.

Tan and Suarchavarat report a dramatically different experience in Thailand. "Recent surveys [in 1988] indicate that up to 90% of households in Bangkok are equipped with a color television set, and that about 37 American television programs are broadcast regularly; more than 80% of the American programs are dubbed in the Thai language" (Tan and Suarchavarat, 1988, p. 649). They also provide evidence that the Thai people are becoming more vindictive and are abandoning the traditional forgiveness derived from Buddhism because of Chinese and Japanese television influences. No mention is made of cultural influence by American television programming, but the establishment of stereotypes is well illustrated:

Our study provides evidence that American television is a major source of the social stereotypes of Americans held by Thai college students. The pervasiveness of American television in the survey community, as well as lack of information about Americans from other sources, helps explain these results. This study provides evidence that television's enculturation effects can be extended to foreign audiences. (1988, p. 654)

These findings are the counter point to the Australian experience. Where the Australian children showed cultivation effects that influenced their perception of their home based on the foreign influence of American television programming, the Thai university students formed stereotypical images of Americans as a cultivation effect. "It is clear from this analysis that television is the major source of social stereo-types of Americans among our Thai sample" (Tan and Suarchavarat, 1988, p. 652).

Tan and Suarchavarat also note that the Thai people were mainstreamed towards Chinese and Japanese culture, but not toward American culture. The cultural differences between Thailand and America were perhaps too great to bridge. Where the Australians were able to ignore the accents and wrong way drivers of American programming, the Thai students were not able to see themselves in American programming. Whether this is due to physical differences, language barriers, high-context versus low-context cultures, or just the themes used in American programming being so far from the experience of Thai people that all credibility for application to Thailand was lost was not explored. This experience is an important data point. The intercultural mass communication of American television programming in Thailand resulted in stereotypes of Americans, not changes in the world view of the Thai viewers.

This experience in Thailand is reminiscent of "similar studies in Taiwan, Mexico and the Philippines, that foreign audiences accept the characterizations of Americans as portrayed in specific American television programs that they watch frequently" (Tan and Suarchavarat, 1988, p. 654). This indicates that not only Asian people, but North Americans also, at least in Mexico, have cultivated stereotypes of Americans as a result of their watching American television programs. This could be seen as a form of mainstreaming since it would tend to give similar stereotypes of American culture to heavy viewers in Taiwan, Mexico, the Philippines, and of course Thailand. As Tan and Suarchavarat point out "Our study provides evidence that American television is a major source of social stereotypes of Americans held by Thai students. Frequency of viewing American television predicted 24 adjective ratings of Americans, while respondent's income, the next most frequent predictor, was significantly related to only 9 adjective ratings" (1988, p. 654).

The similar Mexican and Chinese examples of stereotyping discussed above were documented by Tan, Li, and Simpson in 1986. They reported that "the images of Americans depicted in the three programs considered by our respondents to be the most accurate portrayals of Americans are projected to some extent to Americans in general by heavy viewers of these programs" (p.814). These stereotypes were mostly negative, having been drawn from Dynasty, Dallas, and Three's Company. There was no mention of cultural changes in the viewers, other than the cultural change associated with forming a negative image of Americans.

This example of cultivation effects shows that heavy viewers can become enculturated with negative stereotypes as a result of heavy viewing. These stereotypes may be a narrow view of the exporting country, since only a limited amount of television is exported. As more channel bandwidth becomes available, perhaps the narrow stereotypes could be replaced by a more accurate view of the exporting society.

Hong Kong appears to have escaped the onslaught of American television more completely than most rapidly developing nations have. The Hong Kong residents prefer Cantonese television and traditional themes, even to the extent that the kung fu genre was actually exported to the United States. Thus the opportunity for cultivation by American television did not occur (Lee, 1991). Hong Kong is the first clear example that the introduction of television, including imported programming, need not result in perceptual changes on the part of the heavy viewers in the host country. Hong Kong has remained their own market, having their own preferences, and not watching enough American television to be classified as heavy viewers. This is similar to the Chinese data, indicating that the Chinese watch very little television, even though it is available (Shanahan and Morgan, 1992).

Immigrant experiences

Choi and Tamborini set out to investigate cultivation effects in Korean Immigrants in Baltimore, Maryland and Lansing, Michigan. They expected to find the perception of a "mean and scary world" in heavy viewers. This was not the case. The data showed that although these immigrants had been in the United States for more than six years, the expected cultivation effects did not occur. This consistent denial of cultivation effects occurred at both locations

Since the subjects were all adults, old enough to internalize the message content, and resident long enough to manifest the cultivation effects, the explanation for their failure to do so might lie in several areas. The cultivation effect itself may be incorrectly supported in the tests that support its existence. The cultivation effect may not be well suited to Korean immigrants. The cultivation effect may not be applicable to any immigrants. The cultivation effect may not be applicable to Koreans at all.

Choi and Tamborini explain that:

In a sense, the rejection of the cultivation hypothesis among the Korean immigrants appeared to be consistent with Y. Kim's report (1977a, 1978) that the strength of associations of the immigrant's interethnic/interpersonal communication with their perceptual refinement is stronger than that of their consumption of host mass media. In other words, the television's cultivation potential among foreign immigrants is, if any, at best contingent upon some other possibly confounding or anteceding factors, or even upon some unspecified variable -- i.e., gender, marital status, travel experiences, knowledge of crime victims among acquaintances, perceived credibility of media content, relevancy of media messages and other media uses. (Choi and Tamborini, 1988, p. 70)

This explanation would argue that immigrants are not likely to be affected by the cultivation process in any context, American or other.

Intercultural mainstreaming in America

The regional diversity within the United States results, in part, from cultural differences. This regional diversity has been facilitated by waves of emigrants settling in close proximity, family ties within communities, localized influences of churches, industries, and educational institutions, as well as political ties that go back to the Civil War, and the revolutionary war. These diversities are threatened by mainstreaming since television programming is almost homogenous across all regions. Even local news gets much of their information from national sources, and local stories fill a limited amount of time. Local personalities are being replaced by neighborly but national talk show hosts. Commercials for local dealers are based on national programs with themes, music, and clips. This homogenous television fare ought to be eroding regional diversity if Gerbner, et al. are correct.

Michael Morgan took this expectation to the field, investigating regional diversity by examining General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center between 1975 and 1983. He found extensive support for mainstreaming, but found little change in diversity over time.

The basis for the expectation that regional diversity is eroded by television has roots in the almost instinctive reaction to television that we have seen in more primitive environments. Television is seen as an "evil spirit" bringing unwelcome ideas and eroding the authentic culture of the people affected.

The basic idea has been expressed by various writers. Over 50 years ago, Oggburn and Gilfillan (1933) catalogued what they saw as some effects of radio, many of which involved a reduction in regional heterogeneity. In the mid-1950s, as television was entrenching itself with remarkable swiftness, the idea seemed to have great urgency. Glynn (1956) noted that "television can be seen as the great destroyer of provincialism" (p. 181; see also Bogart, 1956; Seldes, 1957). As television was becoming less of a novelty in the 1960s, the idea seemed almost self-evident to some. Sinonson (1966),for example, observed that "regionalisms are disappearing" because of television (p. 167; see also Skornia, 1965; Wilensky, 1964). (Morgan, 1986, p. 126)

Morgan remarks that the mainstreaming accomplished by television stresses consumer values, violence in the nation and the world, and an expectation that everyone agrees with the mainstream view. "Taken together, these patterns have been interpreted as signaling the cultivation of a 'new populism,' where heavy viewers think like conservatives, want like liberals, but call themselves moderate (Gerbner, et al., 1982)" (Morgan, 1986, p. 129).

Morgan found support for the hypothesis that heavy viewers would have less regional diversity than light or moderate viewers. "In 57 (82.6%) of the 69 tests on the simple data, heavy viewers showed less deviation across regions than did light viewers" (1986, p. 133). Correlating the data over time was not as intuitively rewarding. It was shown from the data that the regional diversity of heavy viewers was more constant over time than expected, that is, the mainstreaming was not increasing over the years of the study.

Light and medium viewers did seem to become less heterogeneous over the years of the study, perhaps indicating that the mainstreaming was already completed for the heavy viewers when the study commenced. The reduction in heterogeneity over time for light and medium viewers could indicate continuous exposure to smaller amounts of television resulted in slow but sure mainstreaming of even light viewers. This cumulative effect is different from the normal characterization of cultivation, that heavy viewers have a markedly different world view than light viewers, but it is consistent with the theory that television viewing tends to pull the viewer into the mainstream of the programming. It could also be concluded from the data that mainstreaming is a very quick phenomena for heavy viewers, perhaps taking less than a year to accomplish. This would account for the more steady heterogeneity of the heavy viewers from single year to single year.

One interesting sidebar to Morgan's work indicated that the "center of gravity of the television mainstream appears to be firmly located in the greater Southeastern U.S. This is particularly intriguing given that the economic and production centers of the media industries are in the Northeast and on the West Coast" (1986, p. 136). If this portends a mainstream of American life in the conservative Southeastern states, the political movement toward the center may in fact be a more conservative shift in direction than originally thought. This also calls into question the specter of the media as a liberal institution. If the conservative Southeast is the center that we all stream towards, the media industry must be more of a closet conservative than popular conversation would expect.

Japanese intercultural studies

Japanese television broadcasts imported American shows in addition to their own shows. Iwao, de Sola Pool, and Hagiwara investigated the type and frequency of violence on Japanese television. They found that while the incidence of violence was slightly higher for American programming, the duration was slightly higher for Japanese programming. In addition the slightly longer program duration in America resulted in the minutes of violence per hour being almost identical. 80% of the Japanese programming contained violence. According to Gerbner, et al. 81% of American programming contained violence at the same time. This similar amount of violence contrasts with what Iwao, de Sola Pool, and Hagiwara found regarding the type and character of violence produced in Japan as compared to the violent themes produced in America.

The American violence was typically the good character killing or injuring a bad character, with no evidence of suffering and the violence was expected to elicit the support of the audience. The Japanese violence was typically a good character being harassed or tortured by a bad character with intense suffering shown. Even in the cases of good characters assaulting bad characters, suffering was commonly shown.

While random and purposive violence are found on both Japanese and U.S. television, suffering in violence is peculiar to Japan. The protracted agony that characters suffer shocks U.S. viewers of Japanese TV and leaves them convinced that Japanese TV is much more violent than their own. Many Japanese, on the other hand, are convinced that U.S. detective thrillers are much more violent than anything on Japanese television. This divergence in perceptions highlights the problem of comparing data in the context of culturally determined definition of violence. (Iwao, de Sola Pool, and Hagiwara, 1981, p. 31)

The Japanese television programs tend to provoke sympathy for the hero by showing the hero suffering unjustly at the hands of an evil person. This is typically followed by a triumph of good over evil where the stoic resistance of the hero is rewarded by eventual victory. "The important point is the, even allowing for the fantasy counterpoint in cartoons, the net tone of Japanese programs is more that of a morality story than is the American....The most important violence, that experienced by major characters, is something that arouses distress and sympathy, not something to be cheered" (Iwao, de Sola Pool, and Hagiwara, 1981, p. 36).

Japanese viewers were found to be apt to believe that depictions on television were accurate for various nationalities and occupations, but not for family members (Greenberg, Hairong, Ku and Tokinoya, 1991). This was also found in the case of the American television show Dallas, that failed miserably in Japan. The Japanese require their television shows to be believable. When Dallas was not believable, it was rejected (Katz, Liebes, Iwao, 1991). Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese viewers did not believe any characters were accurate on television (Greenberg, Hairong, Ku and Tokinoya, 1991). This finding might lead us to reasons for limited cultivation effects in China, Korea, and Taiwan, since they did not seem to believe the television character depictions at all. Asian audiences in general seem less inclined to watch television than western audiences. The Chinese are least likely to exhibit heavy viewing (Shanahan and Morgan, 1992). This may also prevent the cultivation effect from being felt at all in China.

The students polled in Taiwan and Korea by Shanahan and Morgan in 1991 indicated a mean weekly viewing time of about 15 hours. This contrasts with the American mean of about 20 hours. The lower figure could partly result from cultural pressures "against the 'waste' of time that television is often conceived to be" (p. 44).

Conclusion

Several examples of intercultural cultivation have been found. Viewers in Australia had different views of Australian life if they watched more American television. The Cree Indians believed everything that they saw on television, and became wary of its influence as a result. Philippine high school students had different values if they watched more imported television. Viewers in Thailand seemed to exhibit different values if they watched more Chinese and Japanese television. Viewers in Thailand, Taiwan, Mexico, and the Philippines all seemed to form stereotypical images of Americans and life in America as a result of watching imported American television programs. Intercultural differences in the United States were minimized in heavy viewers. All of these examples indicate what must seem like an intuitive truism at this point; television changes the viewer's world view.

Other examples are not so supportive of cultivation analysis theories. Immigrants from Korea were shown to exhibit no cultivation effects at all. British viewers did not see enough American television to be classed as heavy viewers of American television. The Treaty Indians in Canada seemed to watch less television than other Canadians, possibly because the content seemed irrelevant to them. Hong Kong imports television programs, but has stayed true to their own brand of television programming, even exporting the kung fu genre. The Chinese don't watch much television, even though it is available and they produce their own shows. Korean and Taiwanese viewers watch less than Americans, and do not exhibit cultivation effects. There has even been a documented "backlash" against television in Korea (Morgan, 1990).

If there is to be a lesson learned here, it is that cultivation is widely believed to happen in many contexts, and that intercultural mass media is suspected of causing all sorts of changes to authentic and original cultures. This almost instinctive reaction is supported by analytical research in numerous cases, even in disparate cultures separated by thousands of miles. The exporter of television is cautioned to portray a fairly flattering self image, lest she be stereotyped by the audience at her next international screening. Likewise the national image abroad is likely to be exactly what the nation exports, and the aggregate national consciousness could easily be changed by what the nation imports.

Let both the buyer and the seller beware.

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Copyright 1997 by Robert Wichert
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